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ABSTRACT 
The Government of Bangladesh launched the innovative Food for Education 
(FFE) program in 1993. The FFE program provides a free monthly ration of rice or wheat 
to poor families if their children attend primary school. The goals of this program are to 
increase primary school enrollment, promote attendance, reduce dropout rates, and 
enhance the quality of education. This paper presents the findings of a recent 
International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) evaluation of the FFE program that 
demonstrates the extent to which these goals were met. 
This evaluation uses primary data collected from multiple surveys covering 
schools, households, communities, and foodgrain dealers. The authors first examine the 
performance of the FFE program, showing that it has largely fulfilled its objectives of 
increasing school enrollment, promoting school attendance, and preventing dropouts. The 
enrollment increase was greater for girls than for boys. The quality of education, 
however, remains a problem. Next, they analyze the targeting effectiveness of the 
program, its impact on food security, and its efficiency in distributing rations. In general, 
the FFE program targets low-income households. However, there is considerable scope 
for improving targeting, as a sizable number of poor households remain excluded from 
the program even while many nonpoor households are included. Furthermore, the 
evaluation results indicate that the functioning of the current private-dealer-based 
foodgrain distribution system of the FFE program is not satisfactory.   iv
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Bangladesh has led the world in creating innovative development programs that 
can be replicated successfully in other developing countries. The Grameen Bank 
microcredit program for the poor and the Comilla Model for rural development are 
notable examples. Bangladesh has also implemented the first-ever Food for Education 
(FFE) program, which may soon be added to the list of successful anti-poverty 
interventions. 
The Government of the People￿s Republic of Bangladesh (GOB) launched the 
FFE program in 1993 on a large-scale pilot basis. The program was designed to develop 
long-term human capital through education by making the transfer of food resources to 
poor families contingent upon school enrollment of their children in primary school. 
Pervasive poverty and undernutrition persist in Bangladesh. About half the 
country￿s 130 million people cannot afford an adequate diet. Poverty has kept generations 
of families from sending their children to school, and without education, their children￿s 
future will be a distressing echo of their own. Furthermore, from birth, children from 
poor families are often deprived of the basic nutritional building blocks that they need to 
learn easily. Consequently, the pathway out of poverty is restricted for children from poor 
families. 
Many children from poor families in Bangladesh do not attend school, either 
because their families cannot afford books, other school materials, or clothes, or because 
the children contribute to their family￿s livelihood and cannot be spared. Children often 2 
have to work in the fields, sell various products, or care for younger siblings so that their 
parents can earn an income away from home. Thus, these children bring direct or indirect 
income into the household￿income that can make a difference between one or two 
meals a day for the family.  
The FFE program provides a free monthly ration of foodgrains to poor families if 
their children attend primary school. Thus, the FFE foodgrain ration becomes an income 
entitlement enabling a child from a poor family to go to school. The family can consume 
the grain, thus reducing its food budget, or it can sell the grain and use the cash to meet 
other expenses. The FFE program provides immediate sustenance for the poor, but 
perhaps more importantly, it has the potential to empower future generations by 
educating today￿s children. Education would equip children from poor families to 
improve their productivity, thereby expanding their future income-earning opportunities. 
This paper describes the main features of the FFE program and evaluates its 
performance in fulfilling its official objectives, which are to increase school enrollment, 
promote school attendance, prevent dropout, and improve the quality of education. This 
study also examines the targeting effectiveness of the program, its impact on food 
consumption and nutrition, and the efficiency of the foodgrain distribution system. After 
evaluating program performance, the study presents conclusions for policy. 3 
2. OVERVIEW OF THE FFE PROGRAM 
ORIGIN OF THE FFE PROGRAM 
From 1989 to 1994, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) 
conducted research on food policy issues in Bangladesh under the Ministry of Food￿s 
(MOF) Bangladesh Food Policy Project (BFPP). In 1991, IFPRI conducted a 
comprehensive study of a targeted food subsidy program known as Palli (rural) Rationing 
(Ahmed 1992). The study found that the GOB was providing subsidies equivalent to 
US$60 million per year to run the program. However, about 70 percent of the subsidized 
foodgrains (mostly rice) was going to those who were not poor, i.e., ineligible to receive 
the subsidy. The costly program was simply not reaching those most in need. The high 
cost of subsidy and heavy leakage to the nonpoor motivated the GOB to abolish the 
program in 1992. 
The abolition of Palli Rationing knocked the Public Food Distribution System 
(PFDS) out of balance, as it closed off one of its principal outlets. Before its demise, Palli 
Rationing distributed 20 percent of all public foodgrains. Moreover, the GOB was 
concerned about the food security of the 6.1 million dispossessed ration-card-holding 
households that were formerly entitled to subsidized rural rations. The critical question at 
that time was how government more effectively targets food subsidies to the poor. To 
answer this question, the MOF asked IFPRI to conduct a systematic review of 
alternatives to Palli Rationing. 4 
To undertake this review, in 1992 the MOF commissioned the Working Group on 
Targeted Food Interventions (WGTFI), chaired by IFPRI. The working group included 
IFPRI researchers; representatives of the Food Planning and Monitoring Unit (FPMU), 
MOF; the GOB￿s Academy for Planning and Development (APD); the Institute of 
Nutrition and Food Science (INFS), Dhaka University; the Bangladesh Rural 
Advancement Committee (BRAC); CARE; and the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID). The working group introduced the concept of the Food for 
Education Program in August 1992 in its first draft report, Options for Targeting Food 
Interventions in Bangladesh (WGTFI 1994). Drawing on the WGTFI￿s suggestions, the 
GOB launched a large innovative pilot program, Food for Education, in July 1993. 
An early assessment of the FFE program by IFPRI in 1994 suggested that it had 
been successful in increasing primary school enrollment, promoting attendance, and 
reducing dropout rates. The FFE program had also been cost-effective in transferring 
income benefits to low-income households through wheat entitlements. Due to effective 
targeting, the program operated with a low level of leakage (Ahmed and Billah 1994). 
However, as years passed, the GOB became concerned about the quality of education 
provided in the FFE-supported schools due to increased enrollment rates and teacher 
preoccupation with food distribution. In an effort to relieve teachers of the responsibility 
for food distribution, the GOB assigned this task to private dealers in 1999.  
 5 
EXPANSION OF THE FFE PROGRAM IN RELATION TO OVERALL PRIMARY 
EDUCATION 
Table 1 shows the trends in primary education in Bangladesh during the 10 years 
from 1988/89 to 1997/98. Over this period, the number of primary schools increased by 
46 percent, teachers employed in primary schools by 30 percent, and students in primary 
schools by 50 percent. A disaggregated analysis shows that almost the entire expansion in 
primary education during the period was due to the growth in private-sector schools. The 
number of nongovernment primary schools increased by 236 percent; teachers by 163 
percent; and students by 202 percent from 1988/89 to 1997/98. As a consequence, the 
percentage of nongovernment primary schools in the total number of primary schools 
increased from 16 in 1988/89 to 38 in 1997/98. During the same time period, the 
percentage of teachers in nongovernment primary schools of the total number of teachers 
increased from 18 to 36; and of students, from 15 to 30. There was a sudden and big 
surge in the number of nongovernment primary schools, which increased from 13,043 in 
1992/93 to 28,640 in 1993/94. This increase was in response to a new government 
directive that provided incentives to rural communities to build new schools.  
Data in Table 1 also indicate that the average number of students per teacher in all 
primary schools increased from 61 in 1988/89 to 70 in 1997/98. There are more students 
per teacher in government schools than in nongovernment schools. In 1988/89, 
government schools had a student/teacher ratio of 65, while in nongovernment schools 
the ratio was 50. This ratio increased to 77 for government schools and 58 for 
nongovernment schools in 1997/98. 6 
Table 2 provides information on annual expenditure on the FFE program 
compared to total expenditure on primary education, expenditure on the entire education 
system, and total public expenditure in Bangladesh. The share of the FFE program in 
total expenditure for primary education in the country increased from 4.7 percent in 
1993/94 to 19.9 percent in 1997/98. The share of primary education in total expenditure 
for education at all levels had increased from 47.5 percent in 1988/89 to 52.9 percent in 
1993/94, but this share declined to 45.2 percent in 1997/98. Normally, one would expect 
that the total primary education budget would increase in proportion to the expansion in 
the FFE program. But in this case, the expansion in the FFE program appears to have 
been financed to some extent at the expense of non-FFE primary education. In 1997/98, 
expenditure on the FFE program accounted for about 1.5 percent of total government 
expenditures (Chowdhury 2000). 
Table 3 shows the expansion of the FFE program. In 1993, the program started in 
460 unions, one union in each of the 460 rural thanas in Bangladesh.
1 The program 
expanded to 1,247 unions by 2000. From 1993/94 to 1999/00, the number of primary 
schools covered by the program increased by 262 percent and the number of students in 
the program schools increased by 245 percent. About 40 percent of the students in FFE 
schools receive FFE foodgrains. Hence, out of the 5.2 million students enrolled in schools 
with the FFE program in 2000, 2.1 million students were FFE beneficiaries. About 2 
                                                 
1 The administrative structure of Bangladesh consists of divisions, thanas, and unions, in decreasing order 
by size. There are five divisions, 64 districts, 489 thanas (of which 29 are in four city corporations), and 
4,451 unions (all rural). The FFE program is implemented in all 460 rural thanas. 7 
million families benefited from the program in 2000. Table 4 provides the share of FFE 
schools in all primary schools, and program beneficiary students as a share of total 
students in the primary education system. Currently, the FFE program covers about 27 
percent of all primary schools and enrolls about one-third of all primary school students 
in Bangladesh. FFE beneficiary students account for about 13 percent of all students in 
primary schools. 
In 1993/94, the FFE program started at a cost of Tk 683 million (US$17 million),
2 
involving distribution of 79,553 metric tons of foodgrains. By 1999/00, the annual cost 
increased to Tk 3.94 billion (US$77 million), and the distribution of foodgrains to 
285,973 metric tons. The cost of the program in 2000 translates into Tk 5.20 (US$0.10) 
per beneficiary student per day. The share of FFE in total PFDS foodgrain distribution 
was about 6 percent in 1993/94, which increased to 21 percent in 1997/98, and then 
decreased to 15 percent in 1999/00 (Table 5).  
 
SALIENT FEATURES OF THE FFE PROGRAM 
Since its inception in July 1993, the FFE program has been funded by the GOB. 
The FFE program is one of the foodgrain distribution channels of PFDS. The Primary 
and Mass Education Division (PMED) makes cash purchases of foodgrains (wheat and 
rice) from the MOF for distribution in the FFE program. On average, food aid from donor 
countries accounted for 44 percent; domestic procurement, 39 percent; and GOB 
                                                 
2 The official exchange rate for the taka (Tk), the currency of Bangladesh, was Tk 40.25 per US$1.00 in 
June 1994. The exchange rate was Tk 51.00 per US$1.00 in June 2000. 8 
commercial imports, 17 percent of total PFDS foodgrains during the three years from 
1997/98 to1999/2000 (Table 6).  
PMED administers the FFE program, and the Project Implementation Unit of 
PMED implements the program with assistance from the Directorate of Primary 
Education. At the field (thana) level, the Thana Nirbahi (executive) Officer and the 
Thana Education Officer execute the program. 
The FFE program uses a two-step targeting mechanism. First, two to three unions 
that are economically backward and have a low literacy rate are selected from each of the 
460 rural thanas. The program covers all government, registered nongovernment, 
community (low-cost), and satellite primary schools, and one Ebtedayee Madrasa 
(religion-based primary school) in these selected unions. Second, within each union, 
households with primary-school-age children become eligible for FFE benefits if they 
meet at least one of the following four targeting criteria:  
 
1.  A landless or near-landless household that owns less than half an acre of land; 
2.  The household head￿s principal occupation is day laborer; 
3.  The head of household is a female (widowed, separated from husband, divorced, 
or having a disabled husband); or 
4.  The household earns its living from low-income professions (such as, fishing, 
pottery, weaving, blacksmithing, and cobbling). 
 9 
A household that meets the targeting criteria, but that is covered under the 
Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) program or the Rural Maintenance Program 
(RMP) or any other targeted intervention program, is not eligible to receive FFE 
foodgrains. 
If a household is selected to participate in the FFE program, it is entitled to 
receive a maximum free ration of 20 kilograms of wheat or 16 kilograms of rice per 
month for sending its children to a primary school. If a household has only one primary 
school-age child (6-10 years) who attends school, then that household is entitled to 
receive 15 kilograms of wheat or 12 kilograms of rice per month. To be eligible for 20 
kilograms of wheat or 16 kilograms of rice, a household is required to send more than 
one child, and all primary-school-age children, to school. The enrolled children must 
attend 85 percent of total classes in a month to be eligible for the wheat entitlement in 
that month. Thus, the total wheat allotment to a school may vary from month to month, 
depending on the variation in the number of students who meet the attendance 
requirement. 
Based on the targeting criteria, the School Managing Committee (SMC) and the 
Compulsory Primary Education Ward Committee jointly prepare a list of FFE beneficiary 
households in every union at the beginning of each year. Due to resource constraints, the 
total number of beneficiary households is identified so that no more than 40 percent of 
students receive FFE rations. The beneficiary list is recorded in a registry book. The 
headmaster of the school, who is a member and secretary of the SMC, is the custodian of 
this registry book. Each FFE-enlisted household gets a ration card that entitles it to 10 
receive the monthly free foodgrain ration for sending its children to a specific primary 
school. 
To improve educational quality in FFE schools, the GOB imposed a number of 
additional requirements for the schools to qualify for program participation. Effective 
from 1998/99, these requirements are: 
 
•  Schools are graded by A, B, C, and D classification (A being the highest and D 
being the lowest) on the basis of certain performance criteria. FFE foodgrain 
allocation is withheld for the D-grade schools until these schools attain the 
acceptable performance level. 
•  At least 10 percent of grade 5 students must qualify for the annual scholarship 
examination. 
•  Schools must hold the prescribed annual examination. Students in grades 3, 4, and 
5 should obtain at least 40 percent of total points in the previous year￿s annual 
examination to receive FFE rations. 
•  The FFE ration is suspended for any school in which a random inspection reveals 
less than 60 percent attendance, until the attendance record improves. 
 
By the third day of each month, the headmaster prepares a list of students from 
beneficiary households who met the 85 percent attendance requirement in the previous 
month. Based on this list, the SMC calculates the foodgrain requirement for the school 11 
and submits this requirement statement to the Thana Education Officer (TEO). After 
verifying the statement, the TEO forwards it to the Thana Nirbahi (executive) Officer 
(TNO) for clearance. By the tenth day of each month, the TNO issues a foodgrain 
Delivery Order in favor of one authorized private foodgrain dealer
3 for each union, and 
forwards the order to the Thana Controller of Food (TCF), an official of the MOF. On the 
basis of this delivery order, the TCF issues another delivery order for the dealer and sends 
it to Officer-in-Charge of the MOF￿s Local Supply Depot (LSD). The TEO fixes the 
school foodgrain distribution dates in consultation with the dealer, informs the concerned 
schools of the date by letters, and forwards copies of the letter to TNO, the union council 
chairman, and others responsible for the supervision of foodgrain distribution. The 
authorized dealer receives the monthly supply of foodgrains from the designated LSD, 
and stores the foodgrain in a selected warehouse at the union growth center. Each dealer 
receives a cash allowance of Tk 250 per metric ton of foodgrain, plus proceeds from the 
sales of empty bags that contained the rice or wheat, to cover the foodgrain transport and 
distribution costs. 
Each beneficiary student￿s parent or guardian holding the FFE ration card picks 
up the monthly ration on a day specified by the school. Designated officials (chairman of 
the union council and Assistant TEO) supervise the foodgrain distribution (PMED 2000). 
                                                 
3 From July 1993 to January 1999, SMC had distributed foodgrains to FFE beneficiary households at the 
school premises once a month. However, the GOB had been concerned that teachers were spending too 
much of their time in foodgrain distribution and, as a result, that the quality of education in FFE-supported 
schools had deteriorated. These concerns led to a PMED decision that the SMC would no longer distribute 
foodgrains. Instead, private dealers were appointed (one dealer per union), who have been responsible for 
FFE foodgrain distribution since February 1999. 12 
3. DATA SOURCE 
This evaluation of the FFE program is based on primary data collected in school, 
household, community, and foodgrain dealer surveys. IFPRI-FMRSP carried out these 
surveys in September-October 2000.  
The sample includes 600 households in 60 villages in 30 unions in 10 thanas, and 
110 schools in the same 30 unions from which the household sample was drawn. First, 
the sampling process randomly selected 10 thanas with probability proportional to size 
(PPS), based on thana-level population data from the 1991 census. Second, two FFE 
unions and one non-FFE union were selected per thana. In the two selected FFE unions, 
the program started in 1993 in one and in 1995/1996 in the other. The non-FFE union 
was randomly selected from the remaining unions in a sample thana. Third, two villages 
from each union were randomly selected with PPS using village-level population data 
from the 1991 census. A complete census of the households was carried out in each of the 
selected villages. Then, 10 households that had at least one primary-school-age child (6 
to 12 years old) were randomly selected in each village from the census list of 
households. Only those schools attended by the children in the sample households were 
selected for the school survey. Table 7 provides the list of survey locations and the 
number of schools surveyed in each of these locations. FFE school, FFE and non-FFE 
household, community, and dealer surveys were conducted in the FFE unions, and non-
FFE school, non-FFE household, and community surveys were conducted in the non-FFE 
unions. 13 
Several questionnaires were used in the surveys. The village census questionnaire 
collected information on household demography, school enrollment, literacy, and FFE 
program participation. The household questionnaire collected information on a wide 
variety of topics, such as household composition, occupation, education, school 
participation, dwelling characteristics, assets, expenditures, food consumption, 
anthropometric measurements of women and children, and use of the FFE system. The 
household survey was administered by a team of male and female interviewers, who 
completed separate male and female questionnaires for each household. A male 
interviewer administered the male questionnaire to a male household member, usually the 
head of household. Similarly, a female interviewer administered the female questionnaire 
to the wife of the head of household. The school questionnaire collected information on 
student enrollment, class attendance, dropout rates, teacher qualification, school facilities, 
school expenditures, and FFE program participation. Administering questionnaires to 
foodgrain dealers and program-implementing officials captured various operational 
aspects of the FFE program. A community survey was conducted in all sample villages to 
collect primary data on union-level and village-level variables.  
In addition to the above-mentioned surveys, academic achievement tests, 
designed to assess the quality of education received by students, were given to 3,369 
students enrolled in both FFE and non-FFE schools. These tests were also given to 
children in the sample households during the household survey to correlate test scores 
with household characteristics. 
 14 
4. ANALYSIS OF PROGRAM EFFECTS 
SCHOOL-LEVEL PERFORMANCE OF THE FFE PROGRAM 
General information on surveyed schools and major findings of the evaluation of 
school-level performance of the FFE program are presented here. The effects of this 
program on school enrollment, attendance, dropout, and quality of education have been 
assessed. 
 
General Information on Schools 
Observations during the school survey suggest that, in general, the condition of 
nongovernment primary school buildings in rural Bangladesh are in much poorer 
condition than those of government primary schools. About 11 percent of the total sample 
of nongovernment schools have concrete or tin roofs, brick walls, and cement floors 
compared to 45 percent of all surveyed government schools. 
Table 8 suggests that the average size of FFE schools (in terms of number of 
students per school) is about 27 percent larger than that of non-FFE schools, because the 
FFE program entices more children to attend schools. Overall, about half of all students 
are girls. The proportion of girls to total students is slightly higher in nongovernment FFE 
schools than in nongovernment non-FFE schools.  
Table 8 also shows that average annual school operating expenses per student 
(excluding teacher salaries) are generally low (around Tk 40 per student a year), or very 15 
low (Tk 27 per student a year) for nongovernment FFE schools.
4 Both government and 
nongovernment schools under the FFE program are more intensively inspected than 
schools that are not in the program. Over 90 percent of the teachers in the FFE program 
as well as in non-FFE schools receive training. In FFE schools, fewer teachers are 
engaged in private tutoring compared to non-FFE schools. More teachers in 
nongovernment schools are engaged in private tutoring compared to government schools, 
and this is true for both FFE and non-FFE schools. 
The number of teachers per school (FFE and non-FFE, government and 
nongovernment) ranges from 3.9 to 4.8 and these numbers have remained virtually the 
same since 1992 (Table 9). Female teachers as a percentage of all teachers increased from 
1992 to 2000. In 2000, around 29 percent of all teachers in FFE schools and 33 percent in 
non-FFE schools were female (Table 10). 
Table 11 shows that the educational qualifications of teachers in FFE and non-
FFE schools are about the same. However, teachers in government schools have higher 
education levels than nongovernment schoolteachers. About 32 percent of government 
schoolteachers have a bachelor￿s degree or above. In contrast, only 9.3 percent of all 
nongovernment schoolteachers have a bachelor￿s degree. There is almost no difference in 
teacher salaries between FFE and non-FFE schools. However, the average salary of a 
government schoolteacher is about 2.5 times higher than that of a nongovernment 
                                                 
4 School operating expenses include the costs of stationery and supplies, repair and maintenance, utilities, 
and communication. Information on school expenses was not available for non-FFE, nongovernment 
schools. 16 
schoolteacher. Further, most nongovernment schoolteachers are not paid regularly. In all 
types of schools, each teacher teaches about four classes per day and five subjects per 
week. 
Table 11 also indicates that, mainly due to much higher salaries, government 
schoolteachers are better off than nongovernment schoolteachers, as reflected by the 
relative levels of monthly household expenditures. School salary accounts for about 
three-fourths of total income of government schoolteachers, while it accounts for only 27 
percent of total income of nongovernment schoolteachers. Nongovernment 
schoolteachers mainly depend on agriculture for their livelihood, and are therefore less 
likely to devote themselves to teaching full time. 
 
School Enrollment 
School survey results show that student enrollment in FFE schools increased by 
35 percent per school over the two-year period from the year before the program to the 
year after the introduction of the program.
5 Enrollment of girls increased by a remarkable 
44 percent, and for boys, the increase was 28 percent. In contrast, per school enrollment 
in non-FFE government primary schools at the national level increased by only 2.5 
percent￿0.1 percent for boys and 5.4 percent for girls￿over a two-year period from 
1992 (the year before the FFE program was introduced) to 1994 (Table 12). 
                                                 
5 Half of the sample FFE schools were brought under the FFE program in 1993 and the other half in 1995. 
The change in enrollment is calculated from 1992 to 1994 for the schools that entered the program in 1993, 
and from 1994 to 1996 for the schools entering the program in 1995.  17 
Nongovernment schools had a higher increase in enrollment than government schools in 
the initial year of the introduction of the FFE program. 
Table 12 also shows that the per-school rate of increase in enrollment in the 
surveyed FFE schools declined significantly in the years following the introduction of the 
program, largely due to capacity constraints in the same schools. Nevertheless, year-to-
year increases in the rate of enrollment in the sample schools remained somewhat higher 
in FFE schools than in non-FFE schools. 
A number of studies on the performance of Bangladesh￿s FFE program also 
suggests that the FFE program has resulted in increased primary school enrollment 




Table 13 shows the percentages of total enrolled students that were present in 
schools on the day of the survey. As recorded in the attendance register, the overall rate 
of attendance is 70 percent in FFE schools and only 58 percent in non-FFE schools. In 
order to check the validity of attendance recorded in the school attendance register, 
survey enumerators counted all students in each class in surprise visits to schools. The 
head-count attendance figures were then compared with the figures recorded in the 
attendance register. Table 13 shows that the difference in attendance between head-count 
and official record is fairly small. This suggests that the attendance information from 
school records is quite reliable. 18 
Dropout Rates 
The FFE program helps retain children in school. Table 14 provides results of 
annual dropout rate calculations for FFE and non-FFE schools. About 40 percent of the 
students in FFE schools are beneficiaries of the FFE program. From 1999 to 2000, only 
about 6 percent of the FFE beneficiary students dropped out compared to 15 percent of 
the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools. 
 
Quality of Education 
The quality of education in FFE and non-FFE schools is judged on the basis of 
student/teacher ratio, use of classroom seating capacity, and students￿ achievement test 
results. The following are highlights of major findings. 
A large student-teacher ratio is often seen as detrimental to the quality of 
education. In this regard, by encouraging children to attend school, the FFE program has 
become a victim of its own success. There are more students per teacher in FFE schools 
than in non-FFE schools (Table 15). On average, while there were 62 students per teacher 
in non-FFE schools, FFE schools had 76 students per teacher in 2000. In fact, 
nongovernment schools with the FFE program had 80 students per teacher, while those 
without the program had only 41 students per teacher in 2000. 
Because of increased enrollment and class attendance rates, classrooms of FFE 
schools are more crowded than non-FFE school classrooms. Table 16 shows that FFE 
schools in general utilize about 98 percent of their classroom seating capacity. Indeed, 19 
nongovernment FFE schools exceed the capacity. In contrast, non-FFE schools use about 
79 percent of their seating capacity. 
For this evaluation of the FFE program, a standard achievement test was 
administered to students. This test was given to all fourth grade students in FFE and non-
FFE schools. Table 17 presents the results of the test. The average test scores are lower in 
FFE schools (49.3 percent of total points) than in non-FFE schools (53.0 percent of total 
points), and this difference is statistically significant. Within FFE schools, the average 
test score of FFE beneficiary students (46.0 percent of total points) is less than that of the 
nonbeneficiary students (53.3 percent of total points), which brings down the aggregate 
score in FFE schools. FFE beneficiaries score lower than nonbeneficiaries, probably 
because of their relatively lower socioeconomic status. 
FFE schools have classroom sizes of about 31 percent more students than 
classrooms in non-FFE schools (Table 16). About 40 percent of the students in FFE 
classrooms are FFE beneficiaries and the rest are nonbeneficiaries. If a larger class size 
leads to adverse effects on the quality of education (as measured in terms of students￿ test 
achievements), then this should be true for both FFE beneficiary and nonbeneficiary 
students in the same classroom. Analysis of the achievement test scores shows that, on 
average, the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools scored (53.3 percent of total points) 
about the same as the students in non-FFE schools (53.0 percent of total points), despite a 20 
significantly larger class size in FFE schools (Table 17).
6 Therefore, it is likely that larger 
class size in FFE schools does not necessarily cause lower test scores. 
Table 17 also shows that the difference in test scores is larger between 
government and nongovernment schools compared to the difference between FFE and 
non-FFE schools, with government school students performing better than 
nongovernment school students. Government primary schools have better facilities, have 
more qualified teachers, and provide higher incentives to teachers compared to 
nongovernment primary schools. This indicates that the quality of primary education is 
directly related to the characteristics of primary school. 
 
HOUSEHOLD-LEVEL ANALYSIS 
Most of the comparative analyses that are based on household survey data classify 
the sample households into five categories, defined as follows. 
 
Households living in FFE unions 
  A =  FFE beneficiary households. 
  B =  Nonbeneficiary households having primary-school-age children who 
attend FFE schools. 
                                                 
6 The FFE program targets children from poor households, most of who would not have attended school 
without the program. The socioeconomic status of the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools, therefore, 
can roughly be compared with that of the students in non-FFE schools. However, several factors need to be 
controlled for in order to make a sound comparison. 21 
  C =  Nonbeneficiary households having primary-school-age children who do 
not attend any school. 
Households living in non-FFE unions 
  D =  Households having primary-school-age children who attend school. 




Table 18 presents the characteristics of A, B, C, D, and E household categories. 
The average sizes of the sample households (5.5 persons in FFE unions and 5.6 persons 
in non-FFE unions) are slightly larger than the national average rural family size, because 
the sample purposely included only those households that had at least one primary-
school-age child. The 2000 Household Income and Expenditure Survey (HIES) reports 
the average rural household size of 5.2 persons (BBS 2001). 
Average years of schooling of parents are very low in general, and extremely low 
for mothers and C- and E-category households. Among all adult household members, 54 
and 51 percent of the males, and 73 and 71 percent of the females in FFE and non-FFE 
unions, respectively, never attended school. Indeed, these percentages are very high for 
the C and E categories that do not send their children to school. 22 
In FFE unions, per capita monthly expenditure (as a proxy for monthly income)
7 
is higher for B-category households than A-category households, but A-category 
households have higher income than C-category households.
8 In non-FFE unions, 
households belonging to D-category have higher income than those belonging to E-
category households. 
Tables 19 and 20 present the characteristics of households living in FFE and non-
FFE unions, respectively, disaggregated by per capita expenditure quintiles.
9 The first 
two rows in Table 19 provide results on targeting effectiveness, discussed in the 
following section. 
The results suggest that, for households in the poorest two quintiles (the bottom 
40 percent of all households), about 21 percent in FFE unions and 25 percent in non-FFE 
unions do not send their children to school. 
In both FFE and non-FFE unions, educational attainment of parents and other 
adults is positively correlated with income. Females head a high proportion of the poorest 
households in FFE and non-FFE unions compared to higher income groups. Since the 
majority of the poor households are functionally landless (owning less than half an acre 
                                                 
7 In this study, per capita expenditures are used as a proxy for income for two reasons. First, expenditures 
are likely to reflect permanent income and are, hence, a better indicator of consumption behavior (Friedman 
1957). Second, data on expenditures are generally more reliable and stable than income data. Because 
expenditures are intended to proxy for income, the terms ￿expenditure￿ and ￿income￿ will be used 
interchangeably. 
8 Per capita monthly expenditures of FFE beneficiary households (A-category) include the income transfer 
from the FFE program. 
9 Quintile groups are based on household quintiles ranked by total per capita expenditures. 23 




The household survey was designed to permit an assessment of targeting 
effectiveness of the FFE program. The results presented in the first two rows in Table 19 
indicate that the distribution of FFE beneficiaries among income groups is somewhat 
progressive. About 63 percent of the households in the poorest quintile are program 
beneficiaries, compared to about one-third of the households in the richest quintile that 
receive FFE benefits. However, this pattern also shows evidence of mistargeting, as many 
households in the higher income groups are included in the program. About 35 percent of 
all FFE beneficiary households belong to the richest two quintiles (the top 40 percent of 
households in the income distribution).  
The results reported in Table 21 suggest that the average monthly per capita 
income (expenditure) of B-category households (nonbeneficiary households with children 
attending an FFE school) is 60 percent higher than that of A-category households (FFE 
beneficiaries).
10 This income difference between A- and B-category households is 
statistically significant. This finding implies that the FFE program is effectively targeted 
to low-income households. 
                                                 
10 Per capita monthly expenditures of FFE beneficiary households (A-category) exclude the income 
transfer from the FFE program. 24 
However, there are still some households that have primary-school-age children 
who do not attend any school (C-category households). The household survey reveals 
that many households in this category are extremely poor, and their children contribute 
directly or indirectly to household livelihood. As a result, the opportunity cost of 
attending school for some of these children is higher than their expected income transfers 
from the FFE program. For other poor households in this category, the net income 
transfer (that is, net opportunity cost of children to attend school) would not be enough to 
afford even the bare minimum clothing and supplies needed to send their children to 
school. As a group, these nonbeneficiaries constitute about 13 percent of all households 
in FFE unions and are somewhat poorer than the households receiving FFE benefits. The 
average income of C-category households is 5.3 percent lower than that of B-category 
households (FFE beneficiaries). However, this difference is not statistically significant. 
The FFE program is also designed to target the most ￿economically backward￿ 
unions in each thana. A comparison of average incomes between FFE unions and non-
FFE unions suggests that FFE unions are poorer than non-FFE unions. The average 
income of households in FFE unions is 8.3 percent lower than the average income of 
households in non-FFE unions, and this difference is statistically significant. Hence, the 
geographic targeting of unions appears to be good. 
As described in Section 2, a household is required to meet at least one of four 
selection criteria to be eligible for the FFE program. Table 22 shows that about 44 
percent of B-category households (nonbeneficiaries whose children attend FFE school) 
meet at least one criterion￿owning less than half an acre of land￿yet are not in the 25 
program. The results of the analysis also suggest that 21.3 percent of the FFE beneficiary 
households do not meet any criteria. Nevertheless, 57 percent of these households have 
incomes less than the average income of the beneficiary households who meet the 
criteria. These findings suggest that the official targeting criteria need to be improved for 
better identification of the needy households. 
 
Effects on Food Consumption  
Table 23 presents the shares of household expenditures spent on various food 
items. For the entire sample, rice accounts for about 35 percent of the total food budget. 
Household budget allocations for various foods across the five household categories 
indicate similar patterns, except for wheat. Since FFE beneficiaries receive their ration 
mostly in wheat, the imputed expenditure on wheat for A-category households is higher 
than that in other groups.  
FFE beneficiaries consume 10 percent more calories than do C-category 
households. One-third of program beneficiary households are calorie deficient, while as 
high as 60 percent of C-category households consume fewer calories than they require 
(Table 24). 
Table 25 shows the pattern of calorie consumption across income groups. The 
pattern is very similar between FFE and non-FFE unions. The pattern indicates that 
calorie consumption is highly responsive to changes in income. For the poorest 20 
percent of all households, the average calorie consumption is below requirements. About 26 
two-thirds of the households in the poorest quintile are calorie deficient in both FFE and 
non-FFE unions. 
 
Effects on Nutritional Status 
Within households, some members are at greater nutritional risk than others. It is 
well documented in various studies that preschool children and women suffer from 
undernutrition more severely than other household members. Indeed, an IFPRI study in 
Bangladesh assessing food consumption and nutritional effects of targeted food-based 
programs finds that preschoolers are at the greatest risk of undernutrition, followed by 
pregnant and lactating women (Ahmed 1993). 
The nutritional status of preschool children (aged 6-60 months) is assessed on the 
basis of anthropometric data for all preschool children in the sample households relative 
to a particular growth standard. The standards devised by the U.S. National Center for 
Health Statistics (NCHS) are used in this study. The levels of nutritional status are 
expressed in Z-score values.
11 
Table 26 reports Z-scores for height-for-age, a measure of stunting; weight-for-
age, a measure of underweight; and weight-for-height, a measure of wasting. Weight-for-
height is a short-term measure (indicating acute undernutrition), while height-for-age 
indicates long-term nutritional status of children (indicating chronic undernutrition). 
                                                 
11 Z-score = (Actual measurement ￿ 50
th percentile standard)/standard deviation of 50
th percentile standard. 
Levels of nutritional status in comparison with a reference population can be conveniently expressed in 
terms of Z-score values. A Z-score value of zero indicates a child who is ￿normal,￿ and a Z-score value less 
than ￿2 indicates a child who suffers from a nutritional problem. 27 
Weight-for-age can be viewed as a medium-term indicator, which reflects both acute and 
chronic undernutrition. The results indicate that the average nutritional status of 
preschoolers of FFE beneficiary households is better than that of preschoolers of C-
category of households, but somewhat worse than preschoolers of B-category of 
households. 
Table 27 shows the nutritional status of the other high-risk group, childbearing 
age women (aged 15-49 years), across the five household categories. The Body Mass 
Index (BMI) is used as the nutritional status indicator for this group.
12 A BMI of 18.5 is 
considered normal for adults (James, Ferro-Luzzi, and Waterlow 1988). The results show 
no noticeable association between nutritional status of women and the household 
categories. 
 
Impact on Enrollment and School Participation 
The data from the census of all households carried out in all 60 sample villages 
and covering 17,134 households were used to select the sample households and schools 
and to estimate the level of enrollment and literacy at union level. Table 28 shows that, at 
the aggregate level, the enrollment rates are higher in FFE unions compared to non-FFE 
unions. While there are several instances where enrollment rates are much higher in the 
FFE unions than in the non-FFE unions in the same thana (such as in Kalia, Nilphamari, 
and Chokoria), there are also thanas (Modhupur and Baniachong) where enrollment is 
                                                 
12 BMI is defined as weight (in kilograms)/height
2 in meters. Pregnant women are excluded from BMI 
calculation, because weight gain during pregnancy could bias the results. 28 
higher in the non-FFE unions. There is a large difference in school enrollment levels 
between thanas, ranging from a low of less than 70 percent in Baniachong and Sherpur to 
over 90 percent in Hajigonj.  
These findings indicate that there is a substantial scope for increasing primary 
school enrollment through geographic targeting of the FFE program at the thana level. 
Under ideal geographic targeting, thanas with low rates of enrollment should receive a 
larger share of total FFE resources. However, political constraints may prevent such 
allocations. 
Table 29 presents the difference in school enrollment between children from FFE 
beneficiary households and nonbeneficiary households, based on the household survey 
data. These results reflect the situation in 2000￿seven years after the implementation of 
the FFE program. The first column shows the households with primary-school-age 
children who attend schools as a percentage of all households with primary-school-age 
children. In the second column, the table shows the similar percentages for individual 
children going to school. The difference in results between the two columns arises 
because some households have more than one primary-school-age child. The results show 
virtually no difference in overall enrollment between FFE and non-FFE unions. 
Nevertheless, the overall difference between beneficiary and all nonbeneficiary 
households is about 15 percent and the difference in enrollment between beneficiaries 
and nonbeneficiaries in the FFE program unions is about 20 percent.  
The descriptive statistics presented above do not permit the separation of program 
effects from the effects of other factors. Therefore, we used an appropriately formulated 29 
multivariate analysis to isolate the effects of income and other factors to capture the true 
effect of the FFE program on enrollment and assess its impact on the probability of a 
child￿s going to school.  
The analysis presented here is based on individual observations of 930 primary 
school-age children from the sample of households in the household survey, regardless of 
their school attendance status and FFE program participation. In particular, the sample 
includes all children between 6 and 13 years of age who did not complete primary school.  
We employ a regression model to isolate the effect of the FFE program from the 
effects of other factors on school enrollment. Given that there are several unobservable 
factors that might have determined program placement at the union and village levels, we 
have specified a model of analysis, following the basic model structure of Ravallion and 
Wodon (2000), that considers FFE participation as endogenous.  
The schooling of a child i (SCi) is determined by the participation of the i
th child 
of a household receiving the FFE ration (FFEi), and a set of other explanatory variables 
(child, household, and community characteristics) denoted by X, and indexed by 
k=1,￿,K. The model takes the form 
  i i k
K
k




 ,  (1) 
where α is a scalar, β is a parameter of FFEi, δ is a K x 1 vector of parameters, and εi is 
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where FFEVi is equal to one if the child is a resident in a union that has the FFE program, 
zero otherwise; and µi is an error term.  
The model is estimated in two stages. In the first stage, we explain program 
participation using equation (2), and then we use the resulting predicted values of 
program participation in equation (1) to measure the impact of program participation on 
the probability of attending school. We used two different approaches to estimate 
program participation. In the first approach, following the Ravallion and Wodon (2000) 
model, we use a Tobit specification in the first-stage regression where the dependent 
variable is zero for nonparticipants and is equal to the amount of grain actually received 
by participants. In the second approach, we use a simple probit model in the first stage, 
where the dependent variable is 1 if the household participates in the program, zero 
otherwise. 
The estimation of the second-stage equation, reported in equation (3), is virtually 
the same in both model specifications, even though the value of the coefficient of the FFE 
variable will have a different meaning, depending on the specification used in the first 
stage. To control for the correlation between instruments used in the first stage and the 
error term in the second stage, we have added to the estimation the predicted value of the 
residuals from the estimation of the first-stage regression (FFERi) (Ravallion and Wodon 
2000; Datt and Ravallion 1994; Rivers and Voung 1988), as follows:  
  i i k
K
k




 .  (3) 31 
The results of the models are reported in Table 30. The first four columns report 
the results of Model 1, where the first stage is estimated using a Tobit. The last four 
columns report the results of Model 2, where the first stage is estimated using a probit.  
The results of the first-stage regressions of the two models (columns 1 and 2 for 
Model 1 and columns 5 and 6 for Model 2) are quite similar. Among the four official 
criteria for FFE beneficiary selection, only one criterion￿the household head￿s principal 
occupation is day laborer￿is a statistically significant determinant of program 
participation. The values of ￿housing￿ and ￿other assets￿ are strongly and negatively 
correlated with program participation, which indicates that the program is effectively 
targeted to poorer households.  
Columns 3 and 4 for Model 1 and columns 7 and 8 for Model 2 present the results 
of the probit model on the determinants of school enrollment. The estimated coefficient 
of the amount of FFE transfer in Model 1 (with the Tobit first-stage specification) imply 
that, at the sample mean transfer of 70 kilograms of FFE grain over the five-month period 
of survey recall, the probability of a household￿s child￿s going to school increases by 7.9 
percent. The results of Model 2 (with the probit first-stage specification) show this 
increase in the probability to be 8.4 percent.
13, 14 
                                                 
13 This result may be compared with the preceding result of a descriptive analysis that shows about 15 
percent higher enrollment for beneficiary households than for nonbeneficiary households. 
14 The result presented here shows a smaller impact of the FFE program on school enrollment than those 
presented by Ravallion and Wodon (2000). Ravallion and Wodon used the 1995/96 Household Expenditure 
Survey data set, while the present analysis is based on data collected in 2000. As was pointed out earlier, 
the impact of the program was much larger at the time of introduction of the FFE program. 32 
The results of the models also show that girls have a higher probability of being 
enrolled compared to boys. While household size is negatively correlated with school 
enrollment, the number of siblings of any gender does not appear to affect whether a 
child goes to school. 
All four variables representing the levels of education of male and female 
household members have a strong and positive impact on child primary school 
enrollment. On the other hand, the probability of a primary-school-age child￿s school 
enrollment decreases if the household head is engaged in own farming activities (which 
may increase the demand for child labor, as was found by Ravallion and Wodon [2000]). 
The probability also decreases if the wage rate in the village increases, indicating the 
effect of an increased opportunity cost of the child￿s school attendance.  
The total value of productive assets has a positive impact on enrollment. This 
result may be interpreted as follows. An increase in the value of productive assets is 
likely to increase income of the household as well as the marginal productivity of family 
labor. While an increase in the marginal productivity of labor is expected to increase the 
opportunity cost of sending a child to school, the increased income can also be expected 
to reduce demand for a household￿s own child labor and to increase demand for the 
child￿s education. The regression result in this case probably indicates that the income 
effect outweighs the substitution effect.  
Finally, the results show that the presence of a registered nongovernment school 
or an nongovernmental organization (NGO) school in the village increases the probability 
of a child￿s enrollment. 33 
FFE FOODGRAIN DISTRIBUTION 
From July 1993 to January 1999, the School Management Committee (SMC) 
distributed foodgrains to FFE beneficiary households. However, there were concerns 
about the quality of education provided in the FFE-supported schools due to teachers￿ 
preoccupation with food distribution. These concerns led the GOB to withdraw the 
responsibility of food distribution from the teachers and assign it to private dealers in 
1999, as described in Section 2. 
In the present system, each FFE union has one dealer who distributes FFE 
foodgrains to all beneficiary households. All grain dealers in the 30 sample unions were 
interviewed for this evaluation. On average, a dealer covers 1,534 FFE card-holding 
beneficiary households and distributes 21.15 metric tons of foodgrains per month. 
The survey collected detailed information from the dealers to estimate costs and 
returns of their operation. The estimates provided in Table 31 suggest that, on the 
average, a dealer earns a profit of Tk 2,356 per month from FFE foodgrain distribution. 
The return on dealer￿s investment is determined by dividing the profit (or net income) by 
the operating expenses. Interest on operating expenses is subtracted from profit at this 
point.
15 The average return on investment is 27.3 percent per year. This is a conservative 
estimate of return on investment, because it is based on an assumption that the turnover 
                                                 
15 The bank-lending rate for commercial activities was 14 percent per year in 2000. The dealers are 
assumed to receive credit at an annual interest of 14 percent, and that they are to repay the loan at the end 
of every year. The average interest on operating expenses is calculated as follows: first, multiply the 
amount of annual operating expenses by the interest rate in decimal terms [(5,709 x 12) x 0.14] = 9,591. So, 
the profit after interest is [(2,356 x 12) ￿ 9,591] = Tk 18,681 per year. The return on investment is 
[(18,681/68,508) x 100] = 27.3 percent per year. 34 
of operating capital requires one year. However, since the dealers lift their quota of 
foodgrains 12 times per year, the rate of turnover of operating capital should be much 
quicker than what is assumed in this analysis. Even the conservative estimates of annual 
return on investment for the dealers are quite high (27.3 percent) compared to the 14 
percent interest rate on borrowed capital. Although most dealers complained about high 
transport costs and labor wages, this analysis suggests that the FFE foodgrain dealership 
is a profitable enterprise. 
Despite the fact that their dealership is profitable, there is evidence that dealers 
often divert FFE foodgrains to the black market for extra profit. In the household survey, 
71 percent of FFE beneficiaries reported that the quantity of FFE foodgrains they actually 
received from dealers was less than what they were entitled to. Reportedly, a number of 
dealers sold FFE foodgrains to private traders, sometimes even at the distribution centers. 
For instance, in two survey unions of Northern Bangladesh, FFE beneficiaries as well as 
other local people reported that instead of distributing wheat every month, the dealers 
distributed Tk 120 to Tk 150 to each of the FFE cardholders every three months. (The 
market value of three months￿ wheat ration was about Tk 440.) The beneficiaries lodged 
written complaints to thana authorities protesting the dealers￿ misappropriation of FFE 
wheat. In another instance, some of the extremely poor participants of FFE in a highly 
distressed union reported that the dealer had lent money to them at exorbitant interest 
rates. Subsequently, the dealer took their FFE wheat entitlements because they could not 
repay the loan with interest. 35 
The average distance of dealers￿ foodgrain distribution centers from beneficiaries￿ 
homes is 5.1 kilometers, ranging from 1.5 to 11.2 kilometers.
16 Most beneficiaries report 
that the transaction costs are high to collect their FFE rations from distribution centers 
compared to the old SMC distribution system when foodgrains were distributed at school 
premises. Most schools are within 1 kilometer from their home. 
Mainly due to the reasons mentioned above, the household survey results suggest 
that 92 percent of the FFE beneficiary households prefer SMC to dealers for foodgrain 
distribution. The rationale for changing the distribution system from SMC to dealer was 
to improve the quality of education by eliminating teachers￿ involvement in foodgrain 
distribution. However, 82 percent of the FFE participants opined that there has been no 
improvement in the quality of education with the change. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS FOR POLICY 
Increasing school attendance is an important first step in helping poor households 
acquire the skills needed to boost their real incomes. The Food for Education program in 
Bangladesh addresses long-term poverty and development of human resources as well as 
short-term needs for increased access to food.  
The Government of Bangladesh launched the innovative Food for Education 
program in 1993, which ties income transfers to vulnerable households with primary 
school enrollment of their children. The goals of this program are to increase primary 
                                                 
16 IFPRI survey enumerators measured this distance using the Global Positioning System (GPS). 36 
school enrollment, promote attendance, reduce dropout rates, and enhance the quality of 
education.  
IFPRI evaluated the performance of the FFE program to determine the extent to 
which these goals were met. This evaluation of the FFE program is based on primary data 
collected from multiple surveys covering schools, households, communities, and 
foodgrain dealers.  
The school survey results suggest that the FFE program has been successful in 
increasing primary school enrollment, promoting school attendance, and reducing 
dropout rates. Furthermore, the enrollment increase is greater for girls than for boys. 
Since the inception of the program in 1993, the number of teachers per school has 
remained virtually constant in all schools, while student enrollment has increased 
significantly in FFE schools. As a result, there are more students per teacher in FFE 
schools than in non-FFE schools. Moreover, because of increased enrollment and class 
attendance rates, FFE school classrooms are more crowded than non-FFE school 
classrooms. Consequently, there have been concerns that a relatively high number of 
students per teacher and crowded classrooms in FFE schools have caused the quality of 
education in FFE to deteriorate. 
The student academic achievement test scores, on average, are lower in FFE 
schools than in non-FFE schools. However, further analyses reveal that, within FFE 
schools, the average test score of FFE beneficiary students is less than that of the 
nonbeneficiary students, which brings down the aggregate score in FFE schools. In fact, 
the nonbeneficiary students in FFE schools scored about the same as the students in non-37 
FFE schools on the average, despite a significantly larger class size in FFE schools. It, 
then, is likely that larger class size in FFE schools does not necessarily cause lower test 
scores. Hence, there is a caution against drawing conclusions regarding the success of the 
FFE program based upon lower achievement test scores in FFE classrooms. Follow-up 
research on the FFE program could focus further on this important issue. 
Students in government schools performed better in the achievement test than 
students in nongovernment schools, and this is true for both FFE and non-FFE schools. 
Government primary schools have better facilities, more qualified teachers, and provide 
better incentives to teachers compared to nongovernment primary schools. This indicates 
that the quality of primary education is directly related to physical facilities and quality of 
teachers of primary schools. Therefore, in order to improve the quality of education in 
FFE schools in general and in nongovernment FFE schools in particular, the program 
would need complementary financial assistance to improve school facilities, hire better 
qualified teachers, and provide training as well as adequate monetary incentives to 
teachers. 
The household-level analysis suggests that in general, the FFE program is 
effectively targeted to low-income households. However, considerable scope exists for 
improving targeting, as a sizeable number of poor households remain excluded from the 
program even while many nonpoor households are included. A more accurate, yet low-
cost means testing method, such as the indicator-based proxy means tests to predict 
household income and welfare, needs to be considered to improve targeting (see Ahmed 
and Bouis 2002, for example).  38 
The village census findings indicate that there is a considerable scope for 
increasing primary school enrollment through geographic targeting of the FFE program at 
the thana level. Given the large regional disparity in the rates of enrollment and literacy 
across thanas, it is clear that the FFE program could have a much larger impact on 
enrollment (and consequently on the literacy rates) if larger shares of program resources 
were targeted to areas with relatively much lower rates of enrollment. Particularly, if the 
number of schools and teachers cannot be increased immediately due to resource or 
administrative constraints, then a higher concentration of FFE program resources should 
be considered for those areas where low rates of enrollment are related to poverty and not 
lack of school capacity.  
The multivariate analysis to isolate the independent effects of participation in the 
FFE program from changes in other factors suggests that the availability of the FFE 
program for a household increases the probability of its child going to school by 8.4 
percent. While this average impact may seem to be quite small, it is important to note that 
this represents the situation in 2000￿seven years after the introduction of the program.  
Recently, the FFE foodgrain distribution system began distributing food through 
private dealers rather than through the School Management Committee, as was 
previously done. This evaluation finds that the dealer-based system of FFE foodgrains 
distribution is far from satisfactory. Individual FFE beneficiaries have difficulty claiming 
their free and full ration from powerful and profit-minded private dealers, and hence they 
experience losses in their foodgrain entitlement due to dealer malpractice. Also, a great 39 
deal of time and money is spent on traveling to dealers￿ distribution centers to collect 
their FFE ration. 
Past IFPRI studies on the public food distribution system in Bangladesh conclude 
that ration channels that depend on private traders to deliver subsidized food to the poor 
invariably suffer from heavy leakage (see Ahmed 1992, 2000; Haggblade, Rahman, and 
Rashid 1993; WGTFI 1994). The private-sector profit motive is valuable when it 
stimulates competitive cost-cutting and efficient delivery of services. It is a disadvantage, 
however, when it motivates diversion of subsidized or free foods away from intended 
beneficiaries.  
The FFE program can lower leakage by modifying the distribution system that the 
program had followed prior to the change to the current dealer-based system. In the 
modified system, schoolteachers would not be directly involved in foodgrain distribution. 
Instead, either a local NGO, or a youth club, or even a private dealer would deliver 
foodgrains to the beneficiaries in the school premises on a set day each month. This 
system would empower beneficiaries by establishing a sense of group solidarity among 
recipients, assisting them in clarifying the exact amounts of rations to which they are 
entitled, and facilitating collective action against pilferage. This system would reduce 
inconvenience and transaction costs to beneficiaries in collecting their FFE rations. Two 
past IFPRI studies in Bangladesh￿one on the FFE program (Ahmed and Billah 1994) 
and the other on the Vulnerable Group Development (VGD) program (Ahmed 1993)￿
suggest that both programs lowered leakage by a similar process of empowering 
recipients. 40 
Follow-up research on the FFE program could focus further on program 
extensions aimed at improving the cognitive abilities of children. Two specific issues 
could be explored in this regard￿combining the FFE program with school feeding, and 
expanding the program to preschool children. Experiences in other countries have shown 
that undernutrition reduces a child￿s ability to concentrate and retain what has been 
learned (Pollitt 1990) and school feeding, especially a light snack early in the day, has 
been shown to improve performance in case studies from outside Bangladesh (Grosh 
1992). At the same time, a preschool feeding program (such as the National Nutrition 
Project in Bangladesh) could became a key intervention for improving the cognitive 
abilities of children. Better-nourished preschool children will be better learners in 
primary school and beyond. 41 
TABLES 42 43 
Table 1￿Number of government and nongovernment primary schools, teachers, 
and students 













government  Total 
             (thousands) 
1989/90 37,910    7,429 45,339 154,814 34,402 192,816  10,053  1,721  11,774 
1989/90 37,760    8,023 45,783 162,237 37,819 200,056  10,494  1,851  12,345 
1990/91 37,659    10,487 48,146 160,744 42,103 202,847  10,722  2,313  13,035 
1991/92 38,097    11,867 49,964 158,180 50,091 208,271  11,157  2,560  13,717 
1992/93 37,855    13,043 50,898 160,497 54,282 214,779  11,239  2,963  14,202 
1993/94 37,528    28,640 66,168 159,538 82,714 242,252  11,266  3,919  15,185 
1994/95 37,717    24,900 62,617 161,251 87,532 248,783  11,826  4,603  16,429 
1995/96 37,752    23,831 61,583 161,026 88,689 249,715  12,026  5,042  17,068 
1996/97 37,348    24,290 61,638 161,597 88,331 249,928  12,248  5,071  17,319 
1997/98 41,248    24,987 66,235 160,677 90,313 250,990  12,423  5,206  17,629 
Source:  Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). ￿Statistical Yearbook of Bangladesh,￿ various issues.  
Note: Nongovernment schools include (1) registered nongovernment primary school, (2) high school-
attached primary school, (3) experimental school, (4) Ebtadayee Madrasa (EM), (5) high madrasa 
attached EM, (6) kindergarten school, (7) satellite school, and (8) community school. 
 
 










 (million  taka) 
1988/89 ￿  5,439.3  11,444.6  107,527.9 
1989/90 ￿  6,439.1  13,340.9  123,509.6 
1990/91 ￿  6,163.6  13,544.4  124,978.0 
1991/92 ￿  8,366.5  16,775.3  138,159.1 
1992/93 ￿  10,964.7  21,909.3  151,520.3 
1993/94 683.2  14,526.6  27,465.6  182,618.0 
1994/95 1,934.6  17,188.5  35,008.4  206,201.2 
1995/96 2,674.9  16,713.9  34,270.3  197,468.0 
1996/97 3,295.3  17,969.5  37,928.5  235,755.0 
1997/98 3,749.8  18,812.9  41,605.9  255,376.0 
Source: Chowdhury (2000). 
Note: Ellipsis (￿) indicates not applicable. The FFE program did not exist prior to 1993/94. 
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Table 3￿Total number of unions, primary schools, students, and beneficiaries 















Total number of 
students benefited 
under the FFE 
program 
Number of FFE 
beneficiary 
families 
1993/94 460  4,914  1,504,437  706,519  549,881 
1994/95 1,000  12,182  3,619,243  1,628,659  1,416,932 
1995/96 1,243  16,159  4,960,813  2,239,805  1,962,496 
1996/97 1,243  17,203  5,719,590  2,280,467  2,174,503 
1997/98 1,243  17,403  5,739,890  2,295,956  2,182,215 
1998/99 1,247  16,117  4,512,760  1,692,245  1,636,260 
1999/00 1,247  17,811  5,187,553  2,075,021  2,020,660 
Source:  Directorate of Primary Education. 
 
Table 4￿Coverage by the FFE program 
Year 
Schools covered by the 
FFE program as a share 
of total primary schools 
Students in schools under 
the FFE program as a 
share of total students 
enrolled under primary 
education 
FFE beneficiary students as a 
share of total students under 
primary education 
 (percent) 
1993/1994 7.4  9.9  4.7 
1994/1995 19.5  22.0  9.9 
1995/1996 26.2  29.1  13.1 
1996/1997 27.9  33.0  13.2 
1997/1998 26.3  32.6  13.0 
Source:  Computed from Tables 1 and 3. 
 
Table 5￿Expenditure on FFE, and distribution foodgrains under the FFE program 





program   
Rice Wheat  Total 
Share of the FFE 
program in total PFDS 
foodgrain off-take 
  (million Taka)    (metric tons)  (percent) 
1993/94 683.18    216  79,337  79,553  6.1 
1994/95 1,934.59    6,024  168,462  174,486  12.5 
1995/96 2,674.94    3,897  237,273  241,170  13.4 
1996/97 3,295.35    209,625  67,760  277,385  19.9 
1997/98 3,749.83    71,039  269,624  340,663  21.0 
1998/99 3,954.29    59,636  227,026  286,662  13.4 
1999/00 3,935.66    112,058  173,915  285,973  15.0 
Source:  Directorate of Primary Education, Directorate of Food. 45 




procurement   Food  aid     
Year  Rice Wheat    Rice  Wheat    Rice  Wheat    Total 
  (thousand metric tons) 
1997/98 92.00  155.00    399.24  217.43    0.00  549.00    1,412.67 
1998/99 333.82 429.01   493.15 257.30    58.90  1,174.36    2,746.54 
1999/00 0.00 0.00    756.48  210.72    4.52  864.95    1,836.67 
Source: Directorate of Food. 
 
Table 7￿FFE survey locations and number of primary schools surveyed 
      
Number of schools 
surveyed 
District  Thana  FFE union  Non-FFE union  FFE  Non-FFE  Total
            
Manikgonj Manikgonj  Dighi  Hatipara  4  1  10 
   Krishnapur    5     
Tangail Modhupur  Sholakuri  Birtara  3  4  10 
   Aushnara    3     
Sherpur Sherpur  Charmocharia  Bajitkhila  3  4  10 
   Boliarchar   3     
Cox￿s Bazar  Chakoria  Pekua  Harbang  3  4  10 
   Veola-Manikchar    3     
Chandpur Hajigonj  Hatila  Daskin  Rajargon  4  3 10 
   Daskin  Gandarbapur    3     
Hobigonj Baniachong  Daskin-Paschim-
Baniachong 
Muradpur 5  3  10 
   Poliarkandi    2     
Noagaon Mohadebpu
r 
Uttar Gram  Roygaon  3  4  12 
   Mohadebpur    5     
Nilphamari Nilphamari  Chapra-Saramjani  Kochukata  3  4  10 
   Polashbari   3     
Barisal Agailjhara  Razihar  Gaila  3  7  15 
   Bagdha    5     
Narail Kalia  Salamabad  Hamidpur  4  6  13 
   Khasial    3     
Total       70  40  110 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000,￿ Bangladesh. 46 
Table 8￿General information, by type of schools 
  FFE schools  Non-FFE schools 
Information Government  Nongovernment  All  Government  Nongovernment  All 
            
Number of students per 
school in 2000  350 315  343  286 162  270 
Proportion of girls (% 
of total)  50.0 50.0  50.0  50.0 48.3  49.9
Average operating 
expenses per student 
(taka/year)* 43  27  40  41  ￿  ￿ 
Inspection made by 
school inspectors in 
1999 (% of schools)  100.0  92.9 98.6 88.6  80.0  87.5
Number of inspections 
in 1999  5.7 3.4  5.2  5.1 2.4  4.8 
Fully follow 
curriculum (% of 
schools) 94.6  92.9  94.3 91.4  100.0  92.5
Teachers who received 
subcluster training  
(% of schools)  94.3  90.9  93.7  98.1  100.0  98.3
Teachers engaged in 
private tutoring (% of 
teachers) 14.3  50.0  21.4 25.7  80.0  32.5
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
Note: Ellipsis (￿) indicates information was not available. 
School operating expenses exclude teacher salaries, and include the costs of stationery and supplies, repair 
and maintenance, utilities, and communication.  
 
Table 9￿Number of teachers per school, 1992-2000 
FFE schools     Non-FFE schools 
Year  Government Nongovernment All   Government Nongovernment All 
  
1992 4.8  4.1 4.6  4.5  4.0  4.4 
1993 4.6  4.1 4.5  4.4  4.0  4.4 
1994 4.6  4.1 4.5  4.5  4.0  4.5 
1995 4.7  4.1 4.5  4.6  4.0  4.5 
1996 4.7  3.9 4.5  4.6  4.0  4.5 
1997 4.6  3.9 4.5  4.7  4.0  4.6 
1998 4.4  4.0 4.4  4.7  4.0  4.6 
1999 4.5  4.0 4.4  4.4  4.0  4.3 
2000 4.7  3.9 4.5  4.4  4.0  4.4 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
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Table 10￿Percentage of female teachers per school, 1992-2000 
FFE schools     Non-FFE schools 
Year  Government Nongovernment  All   Government Nongovernment 
  (percent) 
1992  17.5  27.9 19.6 22.9  ￿ 
1993  18.2  27.9 20.0 22.7  ￿ 
1994  19.8  29.6 21.6 24.1  ￿ 
1995  20.9  27.9 22.5 26.7  ￿ 
1996  21.3  29.3 22.9 24.2  ￿ 
1997  21.7  29.3 22.9 26.7  ￿ 
1998  26.4  28.6 26.3 29.8  ￿ 
1999  30.6  30.4 30.5 31.8  ￿ 
2000  28.9  29.3 29.2 33.1  ￿ 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
Note: Ellipsis (...) indicates information was not available. 
 
Table 11￿Information about teachers 
FFE schools     Non-FFE schools    

















Educational qualifications (percent of teachers)        
  S.S.C.  37.4  43.6  38.5    34.2 55.0 36.5   36.2 46.7 
  H.S.C.  29.8  43.6  32.2    31.0 40.0 32.0   30.2 42.7 
  B.A./B.A. B.Ed.  27.5  10.9  24.6    28.4 5.0  25.7    27.8 9.3 
  M.A./M.A. M.Ed  3.8  -  3.2    5.2  -  4.5    4.3  - 
  Other  1.5  -  1.3    0.6 -  0.6    1.2 - 
Number of classes taught 
per day  3.9  4.2  4.0    4.0 4.4 4.1   4.0 4.3 
Number of subjects 
taught   5.3  4.9  5.3    5.2 5.1 5.1   5.3 4.9 
Monthly salary (taka)  4,519  1,279  3,960    4,306 1,300 3,960   4,439 1,285 
Receive salary regularly 
(percent of teachers)  95.8 36.4  85.5    99.4  20.0 90.3   97.1 32.0 
Monthly household 
expenditure (taka)  7,013 3,996 6,489    6,956  4,265 6,635   6,991 4,072 
Source of income (percent of total income) 
  School salary  74.8 29.1  66.9    69.0  20.0 63.4   72.7 26.7 
  Agriculture  12.2  56.4  19.9    18.1 75.0 24.6   14.4 61.3 
  Small business  1.9  7.3  2.8   1.3  -  1.1    1.7  5.3 
  Large business  1.1  3.6  1.6    1.3 5.0 1.7   1.2 4.0 
  Other  3.8 1.8  3.5    7.7 -  6.9    5.3  1.3 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 48 
Table 12￿Change in enrollment rate per school, by type of schools 
FFE schools  Non-FFE schools 
Information  Government
Non-
government All  Government
Non-
government  All 
 (percentage  change) 
Before FFE to after FFE (over a two-year period)
a      
All students 
  Boys 



















1997 to 1998           
All students 
  Boys 



















1998 to 1999           
All students 
  Boys 



















1999 to 2000           
All students 
    Boys 



















Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
Note: Ellipsis (￿) indicates information was not available. 
a For non-FFE schools, the percentage change in enrollment per school is calculated at the national level 




Table 13￿Attendance rates, by type of schools 
FFE schools    Non-FFE schools 
Information  Government 
Non-
government  All   Government 
Non-
government  All 
  (percent of enrolled students)  
From headcount  68.8  67.0  68.2    57.2  54.9  56.7 
From school register  70.3  68.1  69.9    58.6  54.9  58.2 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
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Table 14￿Annual dropout rates, 1999-2000 
  Government schools Nongovernment schools  All schools 
  (dropout rates in percent) 
FFE schools (all students) 
All students  10.4  12.5  10.9 
 Boys  9.6  13.5  10.5 
 Girls  11.1  11.6  11.2 
FFE schools (FFE beneficiary students) 
All students  5.3  10.1  6.3 
 Boys  4.5  7.7  5.2 
 Girls  6.1  12.2  7.4 
FFE schools (Non-FFE beneficiary students) 
All students  15.0  14.6  14.9 
 Boys  13.9  18.3  14.9 
 Girls  16.2  11.1  14.9 
Non-FFE schools 
All students  11.2  8.3  10.8 
 Boys  10.9  7.5  10.8 
 Girls  11.4  9.8  11.3 
Source:  Computed by authors based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿ Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School 
Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
Note: Dropout rates are computed using the following formula: 
Drop-out from class i in year t = enrolled students in class i in year t 
  - promotees from class i in year t + 1 ￿ repeaters in class i in year t + 1,  
where 
promotees from class i, year t + 1 = enrolled students in class i + 1 in year t + 1 
  ￿ new entrants in class i + 1 in year t + 1  
  ￿ repeaters of class i + 1 + transfer-out from class i + 1 in year t + 1. 
 
 
Table 15￿Number of students per teacher, 1997-2000 
FFE schools    Non-FFE schools 
Year  Government Nongovernment All     Government Nongovernment  All 
  (number of students per teacher) 
1997 78  70  76  65 32  62 
1998 85  78  83  62 46  60 
1999 77  77  77  65 42  63 
2000 75  80  76  65 41  62 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
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Table 16￿Use of classroom seating capacity 
 
FFE schools  Non-FFE schools 




(number of seats per 
classroom) 53.3  37.5  50.1 48.8  37.3  47.4 
Actually seated 
(number of students 
per classroom)  50.5  43.7 49.1    38.7  29.9  37.6 
Capacity utilization 
(percent of capacity)  94.7 116.5  98.0    79.3  80.2  79.3 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
 
Table 17￿Students￿ achievement test results, by type of schools 
FFE schools    Non-FFE schools 






beneficiary All Government 
Non-
government All 




obtained)  51.0   40.0  46.0  53.3  49.3 53.3 45.7  53.0
   
Performance category  (percent of all students) 
  Poor  31.5  42.7  38.2  26.9 33.0   26.0  41.3 27.1
  Fair  38.0  38.6  35.7  41.0 38.1   41.8  36.5 41.4
  Good  30.4  18.7  26.1  32.1 28.8   32.2  22.2 31.5
                  
Number of 
  students  2,182  342  1,365  1,159  2,524   782  63  845 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: School Survey,￿ Bangladesh. 
Note: Range of test scores for performance categories: Poor = 0 ￿ 33 percent of total points; Fair = 34 ￿ 66 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 19￿Characteristics of respondent households, by per capita expenditure 
quintiles, FFE unions 
Per capita expenditure quintiles 
  1 2 3 4 5  Average
        
FFE beneficiary households (percent)   62.5  48.8  56.3  58.8  32.5  51.8 
Percent of all beneficiaries  24.1  18.9  21.7  22.7  12.6  ￿ 
Percent of households with primary-school-
age children not going to school  17.5  25.0  7.5  7.5  6.3  12.8 
Household size (persons)  5.9  6.0  5.1  5.2  5.4  5.5 
Years of schooling, father  0.8  1.8  2.0  2.7  4.4  2.3 
Years of schooling, mother  0.4  0.8  0.9  1.2  2.8  1.2 
No schooling, adult male (percent)  65.0  58.9  61.3  48.8  33.8  53.5 
No schooling, adult female (percent)  85.0  80.0  76.3  73.8  47.5  72.5 
Female-headed household (percent)  22.5  5.0  11.3  10.0  11.3  12.0 
Less than 0.5 acre of land owned (percent)  78.8  68.8  65.0  50.0  30.0  58.5 
Per capita monthly expenditure (taka)
a 316.60  456.90  571.70  749.10  1,629.00  744.66 
Principal occupation of household head  (percent) 
  Farmer  12.5  15.0  20.0  31.25  28.8  21.5 
  Business/trade  16.3  28.8  15.0  27.5  23.8  22.3 
  Salaried, service  2.5  2.5  1.8  2.5  13.8  5.0 
  Salaried, professional  0.0  0.0  2.5  3.8  2.5  1.8 
  Day laborer  38.8  22.5  28.8  15.0  8.8  22.8 
  Fisherman  2.5  6.3  3.8  1.3  2.5  3.3 
  Rickshaw puller  5.0  7.5  6.3  5.0  3.8  5.5 
  Other  22.5  17.5  20.0  13.8  16.3  18.0 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
Note. Ellipsis (...) indicates not applicable. 




Table 20￿Characteristics of respondent households, by per capita expenditure 
quintiles, non-FFE unions 
Per capita expenditure quintiles 
  1  2 3  4 5  Average
Percent of households with primary-school-
age children not going to school    22.0   28.0  28.0   10.0   8.0   19.0 
Household  size  (persons)    5.0   5.8   5.8  6.1   5.4    5.6 
Years  of  schooling,  father    0.8   1.2   2.2  4.0   5.4    2.7 
Years of schooling, mother    0.1    0.8    0.9   2.2    3.9    1.6 
No schooling, adult male (percent)    60.0    62.5    65.0   47.5    20.0    51.0 
No  schooling,  adult  female  (percent)    95.0   80.0  82.5   62.5  35.0   71.0 
Female-headed  household  (percent)    20.0   12.5   2.5  5.0   7.5    9.5 
Less than 0.5 acre of land owned (percent)    77.5    62.5    55.0   37.5    35.0    53.5 
Per capita monthly expenditure (taka)    338.30    470.30   611.10  817.0  1,765.2    800.4 
Principal occupation of household head  (percent) 
  Farmer  5.0  12.5  37.5  27.5  25.0  21.5 
  Business/trade  10.0  12.5  20.0  20.0  27.5  18.0 
  Salaried, service  0.0  5.0  5.0  20.0  15.0  9.0 
  Salaried, professional  0.0  0.0  0.0  5.0  12.5  3.5 
  Day laborer  50.0  30.0  17.5  2.5  5.0  21.0 
  Fisherman  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5  2.5 
  Rickshaw puller  12.5  10.0  10.0  2.5  0.0  7.0 
  Other  20.0  27.5  7.5  20.0  12.5  17.5 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
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Table 21￿Targeting effectiveness 
   Per capita monthly 
expenditure 
Share of all 
households 
  (taka) (percent) 
FFE unions    
(A) FFE  beneficiary  households  607.92
a 51.8 
(B)  Nonbeneficiary households with primary-school-
age children attending FFE school  973.69  35.5 
(C)  Households with primary- school-age children not 
attending school  575.94  12.7 
All households  733.69  100.0 
Non FFE unions    
(D)  Households with primary-school-age children 
attending school   843.30  81.0 
(E)  Households with primary-school-age children not 
attending school  617.40  19.0 
All households  800.40  100.0 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
a Excludes income transfer from FFE program. 
 







households with children 
attending FFE schools  
  (percent of all households) 
Female-headed household  14.0  12.7 
Less than 0.5 acres of land owned  68.1  43.7 
Day laborer  28.5  12.0 
Low-level profession  10.2  5.6 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
Note: 21.3 percent of FFE beneficiary households do not meet any of the criteria. 
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Table 23￿Average budget share of food items 
  FFE unions  Non-FFE unions   






























schools  All 
  (percent of total food expenditure) 
Rice 35.21  32.55  41.24    35.01  39.22  35.18 
Wheat 4.16  0.92  0.48    0.51  0.31  1.74 
Bread/other cereal  0.48  0.62  0.51    0.58  0.41  0.55 
Pulses 2.55  2.05  1.96    2.54  2.17  2.34 
Oil 2.58  2.65  2.46    2.84  2.42  2.65 
Vegetables 13.19  12.51  11.58    11.79  10.77  12.34 
Meat 6.39  7.76  5.80    6.61  7.00  6.80 
Eggs 1.02  1.25  1.09    1.39  0.95  1.19 
Milk 1.67  3.15  2.33    3.11  2.50  2.58 
Fruits 5.92  7.39  5.20    6.53  5.30  6.39 
Fish 13.89  14.36  15.01    14.74  11.60  14.21 
Spices 4.49  4.26  4.51    4.40  4.73  4.42 
Sugar 5.18  6.22  4.56    5.43  6.10  5.53 
Beverage 2.72  3.21  2.96    3.67  4.31  3.23 
Prepared food  0.55  1.09  0.31    0.87  2.21  0.86 
Total 100.00  100.00  100.00    100.00  100.00  100.00 
Household food 
expenditure 
(taka/month) 2,182  2,788  2,363    2,570  2,309  2,452 
Household total 
expenditure 
(taka/month) 3,372  5,272  3,590    4,569  3,752  4,188 
Share of food in total 
expenditure (percent)  71.00  66.07  70.77    65.95  69.22  68.34 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
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Table 24￿Per capita daily calorie consumption  
 





    
FFE unions  (kcal/day) (percent) 
(A) FFE beneficiary households   2,376  33.3 
    
(B)  Nonbeneficiary households with primary-school-age 
children attending FFE school 
2,651 26.1 
    
(C)  Households with primary-school-age children not 
attending school 
2,154 56.9 
    
 All  households  2,445  33.8 
    
Non-FFE unions   
(D) Households with primary-school-age children attending 
school 
2,480 30.9 
(E)  Households with primary-school-age children not 
attending school 
2,234 44.7 
    
 All  households  2,434  33.5 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 




Table 25￿Per capita daily calories, by per capita expenditure quintiles and type of 
unions 
  Per capita expenditure quintiles 
  1 2 3 4 5  Average 
Calorie consumption   (kcal per capita per day) 
All  households  1,913 2,139 2,456 2,617 3,082 2,441 
FFE  unions  1,900 2,129 2,473 2,591 3,133 2,445 
Non  FFE  unions  1,932 2,145 2,446 2,520 3,124 2,434 
Calorie deficient households  (percent) 
All  households  68.3 47.5 23.3 16.7 12.5 33.7 
FFE  unions  68.8 47.5 23.8 18.9 10.0 33.8 
Non  FFE  unions  67.5 50.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 33.5 
Source: Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 57 

















  FFE unions 
(A) FFE beneficiary households 
Boys and girls  108  -2.19  57  -2.17  61  -1.14  19 
Boys 57  -2.21  58  -2.14  63  -1.16  23 
Girls 51  -2.17  57  -2.21  59  -1.12  16 
(B) Nonbeneficiary households with primary-school-age children attending FFE school 
Boys and girls  66  -1.98  45  -2.10  61  -1.15  18 
Boys 32  -1.96  47  -2.10  66  -1.21  22 
Girls 34  -2.00  44  -2.10  56  -1.09  15 
(C) Households with primary-school-age children not attending school 
Boys and girls  40  -2.59  68  -2.54  75  -1.30  22 
Boys 19  -2.83  79  -2.69  89  -1.49  32 
Girls 21  -2.37  57  -2.40  62  -1.13  14 
All households in FFE unions 
Boys and girls  214  -2.20  56  -2.22  64  -1.17  20 
Boys 108  -2.25  58  -2.23  69  -1.23  24 
Girls 106  -2.15  53  -2.21  58  -1.11  15 
  Non-FFE unions 
(D) Households with primary-school-age children attending school 
Boys and girls  85  -1.93  51  -2.04  56  -1.15  20 
Boys 48  -1.69  48  -1.84  48  -1.09  10 
Girls 37  -2.25  54  -2.30  68  -1.22  32 
(E) Households with primary-school-age children not attending school 
Boys and girls  33  -2.22  58  -2.18  58  -1.10  12 
Boys 16  -2.19  62  -2.03  62  -0.95  6 
Girls 17  -2.25  53  -2.33  53  -1.24  18 
All households in non-FFE unions 
Boys and girls  118  -2.01  53  -2.08  57  -1.13  18 
Boys 64  -1.81  52  -1.88  52  -1.05  9 
Girls 54  -2.25  54  -2.31  63  -1.23  28 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
Note:  HAZ= height-for-age Z-score; WAZ= weight-for-age Z-score; WHZ= weight-for-height Z-score. A 
Z-score value of zero indicates a child who is ￿normal￿; a Z-score value of less than negative two 
indicates a child who suffers from nutritional problem.  58 








 FFE  unions 
(A) FFE beneficiary households  201  19.3  44 
      
(B)  Nonbeneficiary households with primary-
school-age children attending FFE school  153  19.0  50 
      
(C)  Households with primary-school-age children 
not attending school  49  19.8  43 
  All FFE unions  403  19.2  46 
 Non-FFE  unions 
(D) Households with primary-school-age children 
attending school  175  19.4  43 
      
(E)  Households with primary-school-age children 
not attending school  38  18.2  46 
 All  non-FFE  unions  213  19.2  45 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
Note:  BMI (body mass index) is defined as weight (in kilograms)/height
2 in meters. An adult person with a 
BMI value of less than 18.5 indicates that the person is undernourished. Pregnant women are 
excluded from BMI calculation, because weight gain during pregnancy could bias the results. 
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Table 28￿Primary-school-age children and percentage of them going to school, 
village census results 
FFE union    Non-FFE union 
Union 1  Union 2    Union 1 
































Kalia 420  95.2    420  96.2  664  88.1 
Agailjhara 627  97.8    467  82.0  711  93.5 
Mohadebpur 460  81.7    195  90.8  328  81.1 
Nilphamari 538  87.0    746  87.1  726  79.5 
Modhupur 325  84.9    576  84.7  310  88.7 
Sherpur 578  64.0    262  69.9  407  62.2 
Manikganj 290  89.7    230  91.7  287  84.0 
Baniachong 913  63.9    643  57.7  666  68.3 
Hajigonj 552  97.6    1071  97.2  759  93.5 
Chokoria 551  97.5    585  90.8  385  81.8 
  Total  5,254  85.9    5,195  84.8  5,243  82.1 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Village census,￿ Bangladesh. 
 
 
Table 29￿Child enrollment status in 2000, household survey results 
 Household  mean  Individual 
  (percent) 
FFE Union    
  Non-FFE beneficiaries  71.6  68.0 
  FFE beneficiaries  91.1  88.2 
    Total  81.4  78.6 
Non-FFE Union    
  Non-FFE beneficiaries  80.1  78.5 
    
All non-FFE beneficiaries   75.9 73.3 
All FFE beneficiaries  91.1 88.2 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Household Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
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Table 30￿Impact of FFE on school enrollment, econometric model results 
    Model with Tobit first stage  Model with Probit first stage 
   Dependent 
variable: 











goes to school 
  Coeff.  t test  dF/dX  z test  Coeff.  z test  dF/dX  z test 
Variable  name  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
                          
Dummy: FFE union=1  1.574  6.58**        3.950  5.17**       
Predicted FFE beneficiary household                    0.084  1.81+ 
Residual from FFE beneficiary model                    -0.135  4.71**
Predicted amount of FFE transfer         0.113  1.74+             
Residual from FFE model        -0.155  4.23**            
Age of child in years  -0.010  0.78  -0.003  0.62  -0.037  0.99  -0.003  0.67 
Dummy: Sex of child, female=1  -0.010  0.16  0.048  1.94+  -0.045  0.26  0.045  1.85+ 
Number of female younger siblings  -0.193  3.29**  -0.002  0.09  -0.619  3.37**  0.001  0.02 
Number of male younger siblings  -0.069  1.22  -0.028  1.13  -0.218  1.22  -0.027  1.07 
Number of female older siblings  -0.223  3.70**  -0.024  0.94  -0.660  3.59**  -0.025  0.95 
Number of male older siblings  -0.129  2.17*  -0.024  0.97  -0.423  2.31*  -0.020  0.82 
Household size  0.012  0.30  -0.036  1.96+  0.087  0.68  -0.038  2.08* 
Percent members 19 to 34 years of age  -0.642  2.28*  0.272  2.34*  1.820  2.20*  0.273  2.35* 
Percent members 35 to 65 years of age  -0.324  1.04  0.032  0.25  -0.905  0.99  0.025  0.20 
Num. males with primary education  0.200  5.52**  0.101  6.58** 0.600  5.44**  0.101  6.57**
Num. males with education above primary 0.152  3.53**  0.062  3.45** 0.289  2.27*  0.062  3.50**
Num. females with primary education  0.240  5.82**  0.092  5.64** 0.758  6.10**  0.092  5.55**
Num. females with education above primary 0.176  3.87**  0.106 4.63** 0.531 3.76**  0.107 4.68**
Dummy: Household head is farmer=1  0.002 0.03  -0.087  1.88+  -0.043  0.15 -0.082 1.80+ 
Dummy: Household head has business=1  0.166 1.90+ -0.020  0.52  0.419  1.64 -0.018  0.46 
Dummy: Household head is salaried=1  0.016  0.12  -0.036  0.57  0.211  0.53  -0.033  0.53 
Dummy: Household head is rickshaw puller=1  0.201  0.93  -0.034  0.38  0.392  0.64  -0.044  0.48 
Value of housing (10,000 taka)  -0.082  3.91**  -0.006  1.23  -0.227  3.70**  -0.006  1.24 
Value of consumable assets (10,000 taka) 0.006  0.07  -0.025  1.12  0.025  0.10  -0.027  1.24 
Value of domestic assets (10,000 taka)  -0.104  0.77  0.008  0.23  -0.152  0.41  0.009  0.25 
Value of liquid assets (10,000 taka)  -0.079  0.83  -0.008  0.25  -0.170  0.66  -0.008  0.23 
Value of productive assets (10,000 taka)  -0.109  2.99**  0.026  2.26*  -0.307  3.04**  0.028  2.36* 
Value of others assets (10,000 taka)  -0.529 3.82**  0.005 0.31 -1.352 3.29**  0.005 0.26 
Dummy: household head is female =1  0.150  1.29  0.010  0.21  0.305  0.88  0.008  0.16 
Dummy: Head daily laborer=1  0.185  2.17*  -0.025  0.69  0.620  2.41*  -0.026  0.72 
Dummy: Head low level laborer=1  -0.009  0.05  0.006  0.08  0.107  0.19  0.009  0.12 
Dummy: Own land less than 50 decimal=1  0.040  0.68  -0.036  1.48  0.046  0.27  -0.036  1.48 
Dummy: Government school=1  0.622  5.62**  -0.174  5.58** 1.531  5.06**  -0.172  5.52**
Dummy: Nongovernment school=1  0.600  4.76**  0.008  0.09  1.626  4.55**  0.008  0.10 
Village wage rate  -0.000  0.04  -0.003 1.81+  0.004 0.24 -0.003  1.70+ 
Village percent people with <=0.5 decimals  -0.549 1.02  -0.348  1.70+  -0.703 0.45  -0.335  1.64 
Village percent people with 0.5 to 2 decimals -0.958  1.32  -0.239  0.97 -1.810  0.92  -0.219 0.89 
Village Dummy: Grows two crops=1  0.560 3.38**  -0.009  0.19  1.667 3.09**  -0.003 0.06 
Village electrical connections  -0.000 0.58  0.000  0.45 -0.002 1.00 0.000  0.52 
Village has government school  -0.018 1.14  0.002  0.48 -0.011 0.22 0.002  0.36 
Village has registered nongov. school 0.006  0.20  0.018  2.17*  0.010 0.12 0.018  2.16* 
Village has Madrasa school  -0.025  2.35* 0.001 0.28 -0.067 2.24*  0.001  0.40 
Village has NGO school  -0.044  2.03* 0.010 2.59** -0.153 2.29*  0.009  2.53* 
Price of rice  0.135  2.02*  0.023  0.96  0.377  1.92+  0.020  0.87 
Price of wheat  -0.216  1.99*  0.012  0.31  -0.596  1.88+  0.015  0.40 
Price of atta  -0.101  1.20  0.025  1.43  -0.067  0.27  0.023  1.32 
Price of onions  0.035  1.95+  -0.011  2.22*  0.121  2.19*  -0.011  2.19* 
Price of potatoes  0.031  0.48  -0.030  1.18  0.032  0.15  -0.029  1.16 
Price of eggplants  0.128  3.10**  -0.026  2.17*  0.349  2.92**  -0.025  2.09* 
Price of mustard oil  -0.000  0.04  0.002  0.65  -0.010  0.63  0.001  0.63 
Price of soybean oil  0.011  0.42  -0.013  1.92+  0.046  0.62  -0.013  1.85+ 
        (continued)61 
    Model with Tobit first stage  Model with Probit first stage 
   Dependent 
variable: 











goes to school 
  Coeff.  t test  dF/dX  z test  Coeff.  z test  dF/dX  z test 
Variable  name  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Price of pulses  0.041  0.81  -0.002  0.18  0.047  0.31  -0.002  0.14 
Dummy: Living in thana 2=1  1.337  5.36**  -0.421  2.47*  3.789  5.15**  -0.424  2.49* 
Dummy: Living in thana 3=1  1.289  4.97**  -0.614  3.22** 3.155  4.30**  -0.611  3.21**
Dummy: Living in thana 4=1  1.501  4.57**  -0.631  3.24** 3.964  4.21**  -0.631  3.23**
Dummy: Living in thana 5=1  0.948  3.82**  -0.043  0.42  2.966  3.94**  -0.071  0.63 
Dummy: Living in thana 6=1  0.518  1.94+  -0.001  0.01  1.559  2.02*  -0.013  0.13 
Dummy: Living in thana 7=1  0.798  2.80**  -0.021  0.24  2.189  2.70**  -0.031  0.34 
Dummy: Living in thana 8=1  0.907  3.61**  -0.067  0.69  2.825  3.74**  -0.075  0.75 
Dummy: Living in thana  9=1  2.302 1.65+ -0.056  0.13  4.477  1.09 -0.047  0.11 
Dummy: Living in thana 10=1  1.969  1.34  -0.034  0.08  2.848  0.66  -0.018  0.05 
Constant  -5.689  3.38**        -6.212  3.27**       
                          
R-squared  .50     .41     0.56     0.43    
Notes: dF/dX represents the change in probability for an infinitesimal change in each in dependent, 
continuous variable and, by default, the discrete change in the probability for the dummy variables. 
The equations have been estimated using the ￿dprobit￿ command of the Stata statistical software. + 
significant at the10% level; * significant at the 5%level; ** significant at the1% level. 
 
 
Table 31￿Average profitability to dealers of FFE foodgrain distribution 
Item 
Per metric ton of 
foodgrain distributed  Per dealer 
 (taka)  (taka  per  month) 
Total cost  267  5,643 
  Foodgrain loading cost   34  719 
  Foodgrain carrying cost   124  2,613 
  Foodgrain unloading cost   20  425 
 Staff  salary    52  1,106 
 Other  costs  37  780 
Interest charges imputed at 14% per year  3  66 
Total operating expenses  270  5,709 
Total revenue   381  8,065 
 Commission  250  5,288 
  Sales proceeds of sacks  131  2,777 
Profit 114  2,356 
Source:  Based on data from IFPRI￿s ￿Food for Education Evaluation Survey, 2000: Foodgrain Dealer Survey,￿ 
Bangladesh. 
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